Neima Meymandi
Elli Lieberman, PhD
POLI 489: Deterring Terrorism
May 21st, 2019
Final
- After the 9-11 al Qaeda terrorist attack on the United States the common belied was that deterrence success would be elusive because terrorist organizations, rogue states, and non-state actors were religiously motivated, irrational, and willing to die for their cause, leading defenders into a “deterrence trap.” Describe the main schools of thought advanced by deterrence theorists and evaluate their arguments in the 6 anti-terrorist campaigns we studied this semester.
A number of theorists have offered their perspective on whether or not deterrence is achievable and elaborate on how, if at all, it should be implemented. There are currently three schools of thought that any deterrence theorist may fall under, often being defined as skeptical, tactical, or strategic. Skeptics argue that it is not possible to deter terrorists for the vary reasons of irrationality, willingness to die for their cause, and the use of “deterrence traps”. The tactical theorists argue that an understanding of how an organization functions and targeting specific critical parts of their infrastructure, may prove to be how states gain deterrence success. Members of the strategic camp believe that deterrence success can be achieved but only though an understanding of long-term goals and the implementation of a proper strategic framework for success.
Two known skeptics are Richard Lebow and Janice Stein argue that heads of state make decisions based on public perceptions and Stein takes this psychological component further by expounding that emotions may be the causal mechanism driving states to tit-for-tat warfare. Adler attempts to address the issues related to using deterrence against non-state actors and the asymmetric failures that can come from it. He introduces the concept of a “deterrence trap” in which a state needs to decide between the use of force due to the provocation of a non-state actor or by deciding not to act (Paul, Morgan, and Wirtz, p. 85-86). Either choice the state makes will lead to the legitimization of the terrorist organization on the global stage.
The skeptical perspective to deterrence seems to fail when analyzing and considering the conflict between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The PKK’s main goal was to create an independent Kurdish state by seceding from Turkey. Ideally the Turkey wanted to completely eradicate the group but from their perspective, since there was never an independent state of Kurdistan established, it can be considered a partial success. Taking into consideration all the events since 1994, the PKK was able to show resolve by changing the direction of their struggle and modified the strategies they use in order to survive. Skeptics at the time might have argued that when a state is involved in asymmetric warfare, they may suffer from getting caught in Adler’s “deterrence trap”. However, this was not the case and the PKK’s main objective was defeated by the Turkish state.
Members of the Tactical, or marginal, school of thought focus heavily on the individual conflicts and believe that through the destruction of the organizational structures of terrorist campaigns, states may declare victory. Coercion, as defined by Lawrence Freedman, is “…the threatened and ‘actual application of force to influence the action of a voluntary agent’ by weighing on its ‘strategic choices’” (Wenger and Wilner, 2012, p. 95). This use of a coercion is predicated on the assumption that terrorist organizations will calculate risks and benefits rationally. Also, Freedman mentions that a state’s understanding of terrorist strategies will allow for the state to implement a tactical approach to achieve success. Wilner and Wenger also introduce the concept of marginal warfare, where conflicts against terrorist organizations can be fought and won ‘on the margins. This concept implies that a number of organizational pieces need to come together in order to implement an attack, and by disrupting that structure, states are able to deter both states and non-state actors.
Two cases of deterrence success should help to illustrate the advantages of using tactical methods when attempting to deter various actors. The first example of success is considered a partial one in which Israel attempts to defeat Hamas. Initially, it was difficult to deter Hamas due to the changing nature of the organization, ongoing rivalry with the PLO for supremacy of the region, and the strongly religious nature of the organization making its overall defeat challenging.
A second example of tactical deterrence success pertains to Russia and Chechnya, where deterrence was able to be achieved through what Audrey Cronon outlines as repression in her book How Terrorism Ends. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Chechnyan people took the opportunity to elect a leader whose first order of business was to declare it an independent state (Cronon, 2009, p. 131). The Russian President Boris Yeltson was against this act of secession but was stopped when trying to use military force against the Chechnyan election. This battle for independence from the Russian state was fought through two phases, and while the first phase saw failure on the Russian side, the second phase proved to be an overwhelming success due to the new President Vladimir Putin and his commitment to strong short-term tactical success. He was strong in demonstrating his capability and will while also avoiding the mistakes made by Yeltsin. The Chechens were decimated, and, in the process, Russia was able to deter future groups.
The last school of thought that theorists can be categorized into has to do with a strategic perspective of deterrence. Audrey Cronin is a theorist central to the argument for a coercive strategy. She states that in order to properly deter terrorist organizations, one must first understand how campaigns of terror end in order to formulate a method of elimination. Long-term goals and the implementation of a proper strategic framework for success are pivotal when determining deterrence success through various cases in this school of thought. Three cases that take a strategic approach to their success are that of Israel and the PLO, Israel and Hezbollah, and the British and the IRA.
In the first case of strategic success, Israel goes to Lebanon to fight the PLO after tensions begin to rise between the state and non-state actor. Israeli troops march to Beirut but question whether or not they should stop at the Latani River. This creates a slight internal conflict, but they decide to push forward to the city. They reach the capital and struggle in combat. This difficulty leads to the withdraw of forces from Beirut and the Israeli soldiers end up fighting their way through a significant number of Muslim insurgencies. By the end, the PLO is defeated but Israel struggles to save face due to the decision to retreat from the city. This loss of face and absence of the PLO creates the opportunity for a new organization to step in and establish dominance; Hezbollah.
The second case of observable strategic deterrence pertains to Hezbollah. Their main argument for conflict was due in large part to the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. During this time Israel was seen as an occupying force, both creating a deterrence trap and giving Hezbollah more public support to continue the conflict. Hezbollah was able to gain more power and challenge the deterrence equation further by attacking community centers and acquiring Katusha artillery shells. In the 90’s, the conflict caused Israel to lose two separate battles and suffer nearly 4000 casualties. In the early 2000, however, Israel was able to address the credibility problem of the earlier decade by unilaterally withdrawing their forces from Lebanon. This no longer gave Hezbollah a justification for killing Israeli citizens or attempting to occupy Israeli territory, resulting in a reputation eroding event. A small strategic decision gave the state of Israel enough justification to deter their enemy from furthering the conflict, which can be seen though the significant decrease in casualties after their decision to pull out of Lebanon in 2000.
The third and final case of strategic deterrence success can be observed through the British management of the IRA. This case is particularly interesting due to the British strategy of eroding trust between members of the IRA and using intelligence on the organization to defeat them militarily. Towards the end of the conflict, British soldiers were creating an environment in which IRA members found it challenging to target, let alone carry out attacks, on political figures. Each strategy implemented by the British pushed the IRA to the limits of their capabilities. This concept of measuring an enemy’s ability to carry out attacks and the thorough understanding of what they are capable of doing gave British forces the advantage of saving face while eroding the publics perceptions of the terrorist organization.
- Scholars in the “Deterring Terrorism” volume (Wenger and Wilner) find it difficult to wrestle with the ‘action-outcome’ link. What is the causal mechanism they advance and compare it to the solution advanced in this course? Give empirical evidence from the cases we analyzed in class.
Deterring Terrorism is a volume written by Alex Wilner and Andreas Wenger in the attempt to define and understand what they call ‘the fourth wave’ of deterrence literature. They created this volume in order to take all the existing theories related to deterrence and applying them to cases of success in addition to developing a deeper understanding of how terrorist organizations function. The ‘action-outcome’ link is one of the larger problems that they mention in order to illustrate the difficulty of finding cases of deterrence success (Wenger and Wilner, 2012, p. 302). A state could attempt to deter other states or non-state actors, but it is difficult to say definitively that the case resulted in the outcome of deterrence. Credibility may establish a state as a force to be weary of, but how can analysists know that the enemy deescalated for any one specific reason? Additionally, due to the lack of a terrorist organizations having a return address, it is difficult to say whether the group was defeated or simply taking time to reorganize and retaliate.
The idea that Wilner and Wenger introduce related to terrorism is that it can be defeated on the margins. These margins are the simple day to day minutia that come together to become what the public will view as a terror attack. For them, one cannot deter an entire organization, but some people and parts of the organization can be. Tactical elements are given a greater emphasis over the strategic interactions between the two actors. Focusing on the tactics over strategy can prove useful when talking about deterrence due to the emphasis on small scale, targeted, and quick action.
One of the most fundamental ideas advanced in this course is that inevitably, all terrorist campaigns end. This end can come about in many different ways, but it is ideal to ensure that deterrence from future acts of violence is established. While the life of a non-state or rogue actor may span decades, states have a responsibility to consult the literature, in conjunction with cases of deterrence success, in order to respond efficiently and effectively to campaigns of terror. An important case with which a state established their victory over a non-state actor is that of Russia and Chechnya. This case is an exemplary example of how the Russian President Vladimir Putin was able to reestablish his credibility, even after Boris Yeltson experienced a number of military failures. This case can show how a strong understanding and proper application of deterrence theories can lead to a state saving face and reestablishing their credibility.
- How does deterrence work in conventional deterrence against states as well as against NSAs? How is it different from nuclear deterrence?
When considering conventional deterrence against state actors, skeptics argue that it does not work due to the existing data surrounding past conflicts. The success or failure of nuclear deterrence, on the other hand, is slightly more difficult to definitively identify due to a lack of data. Theorists attempt to understand the problem of credibility and its relation to conventional deterrence vs. states actors. Richard Lebow and Janice Stein argue that heads of state make decisions based on public perceptions. The politics of vulnerability states that leaders are more inclined to enter into conflict when they are worried that their actions may be perceived as vulnerable to members of their state. This perception can cause leaders to ignore deterrence and focus on domestic perceptions even if they know they cannot win. By the nature of their argument, conventional deterrence fails due to leaders ignoring warnings from other states. One of the main issues with the theory presented by Lebow and Stein pertains to the cases that they chose for their study. The methodology encompassed analyzing 93 cases of failure while neglecting to offer conflicts where conventional deterrence resulted in success.
Alex Wilner and Andreas Wenger attempt to address how deterrence could work in conventional instances against NSAs. They organize suggestions for deterring conventional terrorism into three categories; indirect, denial, and punishment (Wenger and Wilner, 2012, p. 22). Each category that they present is viewed in respect to how it may have worked on al Qaeda and provides further empirical evidence conducted by other deterrence experts. In addition, credibility is a key factor in assessing the likelihood of any method being used successfully. This is a known problem surrounding current literature pertaining to deterrence due to the importance of an NSA’s perception of a state making threats and the state’s ability to follow through.
The first method, indirect, suggests that in order for a terrorist attack to succeed, other individuals need to assist (Wenger and Wilner, 2012, p. 23). These enablers are people that may be able to provide strategic or even financial assistance to the organization carrying out an attack. By targeting these enablers, a state may prevent terrorists from committing to an attack without the states need for increased security. Wilner and Wenger also mention that other states may be sympathetic to the cause of a terrorist organization. Actions against anyone willing to support these groups may incentivize them to avoid or withdraw support under the fear of retaliation (Wenger and Wilner, 2012, p. 24).
The second way in which a state may conventionally deter a terrorist organization pertains to their concept of denial. The lower the probability of an attack’s success may translate to the groups decision not to follow through with the attack. Wilner and Wenger mention that al Qaeda members repeatedly took test flights before their 9/11 attack to ensure that their efforts will result in success (Wenger and Wilner, 2012, p. 26). In addition to this concept, James Smith and Brent Talbot developed a framework to describe the different ways to use denial against organizations. The three methods that they suggest are; Denial of opportunity which is a Tactical approach; Denial of capability which is an operational approach; Denial of objectives which is a strategic approach (Wenger and Wilner, 2012, p. 26). Of the three approaches, strategic is mentioned to be the most important. This is due the assumption that a tactical or operational failure may not deter groups from following through with an attack as much as a strategic plan would.
The third and final method that Wilner and Wenger propose relates to the punishment of terrorist organizations. How much force a state chose to use against their enemies, in addition to the rate with which they do it, could largely deter future groups from committing acts of violence against the state. Common, and yet controversial, strategies proposed by the researchers involve punishing the family members of known terrorists or attacking the communities that they hailed from (Wenger and Wilner, 2012, p. 29). The knowledge that a person’s family would be held responsible and punished due to that person’s actions against a state would coerce members against attacking and could even prevent future members from joining.
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