Description
Before writing a discussion essey please read the following article that is attached bellow. 1- Summarize the main point, what is talking in the article? 2-What are the political goals pursued by terrorists in the War on Terror? What do they want? 3-Who are the direct victims and the ultimate targets of terrorist attacks in the War on Terror? 4-What kind of strategies has the US been using to combat terrorism?
September 2017
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Defeating Terrorists, Not Terrorism:
Assessing U.S. Counterterrorism Policy from 9/11 to ISIS
1 bipartisanpolicy.org
Task Force on Terrorism and Ideology
Co-Chairs
Members
Governor Thomas H. Kean
Former Chairman, 9/11 Commission; Former Governor of New Jersey
Representative Lee H. Hamilton
Former Vice Chairman, 9/11 Commission; Former Representative from Indiana
Cheryl Benard
President, ARCH International
Joseph Braude
Advisor, Al-Mesbar Studies and Research Center in Dubai; Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy
Research Institute
Dr. Tarek Elgawhary
President, The Coexist Foundation
John Gannon
Adjunct Professor, Center for Security Studies, Georgetown University; Former CIA Deputy Director
for Intelligence and Chairman of the National Intelligence Council
Ambassador Husain Haqqani
Senior Fellow and Director for South and Central Asia, Hudson Institute; Former Ambassador of
Pakistan to the United States
Bernard Haykel
Professor of Near Eastern Studies and Director, Institute for Transregional Study of the
Contemporary Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia, Princeton University
Charles Hill
Brady-Johnson Distinguished Fellow in Grand Strategy at Yale University; Research Fellow of the
Hoover Institution, Stanford University
bipartisanpolicy.org 2
Staff
Sir John Jenkins
Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies Middle East; Former British
Ambassador to Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Saudi Arabia
Nibras Kazimi
Author, Syria Through Jihadist Eyes: A Perfect Enemy
Christopher Kojm
Professor of International Affairs, Elliot School of International Affairs, The George Washington
University; Former Chair of the National Intelligence Council
Kristin Lord
President and CEO, IREX
Blaise Misztal
Director of National Security
Nicholas Danforth
Senior Policy Analyst
Jessica Michek
Policy Analyst
Samuel Tadros
Contributor
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
BPC staff would like to thank those whose expertise, insights, and efforts are reflected in
this report, and gratefully acknowledges Michelle Pea and Blake Hollister for their contributions
during their internships.
DISCLAIMER
The findings and recommendations expressed herein do not necessarily represent the views
or opinions of the Bipartisan Policy Center’s founders or its board of directors.
3 bipartisanpolicy.org
Letter from the Co-Chairs
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, killed nearly 3,000 innocent
Americans. Thousands more Americans have died in the subsequent military
campaigns and intelligence operations that have kept America safe. Sixteen years
later, we pause to honor those Americans lost on 9/11 and those who have served
and sacrificed to protect the American people in the years since.
In 2004, the 9/11 Commission Report offered 41 bipartisan recommendations to
secure the homeland, defeat terrorist networks, and ultimately prevail in what we
termed the “generational struggle” against Islamist terrorism. Thanks to the efforts
of policymakers in both parties, most of those recommendations have been
implemented in whole or in part.
Overall, the U.S. government’s record on securing the homeland and taking down
terrorist networks is good. The courage and skill of our military, intelligence, and
law enforcement agencies have prevented another mass-casualty attack on U.S.
soil. Congress created the National Counterterrorism Center and reorganized the
intelligence community under a new Director of National Intelligence. Homeland
security officials have closed security gaps at airports and at the border. Overseas,
U.S. operations have killed Osama bin Laden and severely damaged the al Qaeda
network. A U.S.-led coalition has nearly driven ISIS from Iraq and is pushing into
its strongholds in Syria.
Yet despite these tactical successes, it is hard to conclude that we are winning.
While we have pummeled terrorists on the battlefield, we have struggled to defeat
their ideas. Unfortunately, recent evidence suggests that jihadist ideology remains
attractive to many, including in the West. In 2014, ISIS’s call to jihad attracted
thousands of “foreign fighters” from across the world into its ranks. Over the past
bipartisanpolicy.org 4
year, even with the ISIS caliphate rapidly losing territory, ISIS-inspired
“homegrown” terrorists have conducted attacks in Europe and the United States.
As long as jihadists can replenish their ranks as fast as we can take them off the
battlefield, the threat will persist.
We can, and must, do better to defeat terrorists’ ideas. Since 9/11, the United
States has expended hundreds of millions of dollars on counter-radicalization and
counter-messaging programs, with limited success. Indeed, basic questions
remain unanswered: What role does ideology, as opposed to political, social, or
economic grievances, play in driving people to terrorism? What is the relationship
between Islamist terrorism and other strains of Islamist thinking? Can the United
States and other non-Muslim actors meaningfully influence cultural and religious
currents in the Islamic world? Which Muslim partners are most credible and
effective in reducing the appeal of jihadism?
This Bipartisan Policy Center project aims to take stock of 16 years of
counterterrorism struggle and make recommendations for long-term success. As
in the 9/11 Commission Report, we begin by “looking backward in order to look
forward.” This paper takes stock of U.S. counterterrorism efforts since 2001, with
a focus on U.S. efforts to counter extremist ideology. A future paper will make
recommendations for defeating terrorists’ ideas over the long term.
Governor Tom H. Kean Representative Lee H. Hamilton
5 bipartisanpolicy.org
Executive Summary
Sixteen years after the 9/11 attacks, the United States continues to grapple with
how to defeat the terrorist threat. The fight against terrorism dominated the
national security agenda of the past two U.S. administrations. It will almost
certainly remain among the major challenges confronting the current president.
This new Bipartisan Policy Center project springs from the conviction that it is time
to assess U.S. progress in this struggle. Much as the 9/11 Commission examined
how the horrendous attacks of that day occurred, it is appropriate and necessary,
more than a decade and a half later, to take stock of both the state of the terrorist
threat and the record of U.S. counterterrorism policies in combating that threat.
What have the significant investments the United States has made in its intelligence,
military, law enforcement, and public diplomacy capabilities achieved? Has the
terrorist threat diminished? Is the United States safer today than it was 16 years ago?
Is the U.S. approach to counterterrorism working? Or is something different needed?
This paper provides an assessment of U.S. counterterrorism policy to date, its
achievements and shortcomings, and compares them against the scale and scope
of the current terrorist threat.
This paper aims to answer these questions. It provides an assessment of U.S.
counterterrorism policy to date, its achievements and shortcomings, and compares
them against the scale and scope of the current terrorist threat. A future study will
develop recommendations for a more effective, comprehensive, and long-term
counterterrorism strategy.
bipartisanpolicy.org 6
In the homeland, and on the battlefield, the legacy of post-9/11 counterterrorism
efforts is in many respects a successful one. Prodigious efforts by intelligence
agencies, law enforcement, and the military have prevented another masscasualty attack on U.S. soil. American forces have found and killed tens of
thousands of terrorists abroad. The combined efforts of the U.S. government have
degraded terrorist leadership, disrupted terrorist financing, and thwarted hundreds
of terrorist plots.
Yet, it is impossible to conclude that the enemy has been defeated. Rather, the
threat of terrorism has metastasized. Last year, terrorists launched five times as
many attacks as in 2001, with terrorism afflicting more than 104 countries.1
Terrorist groups have taken root in Europe, Africa, and Asia, in addition to the
Middle East. New recruits sign up for jihad as quickly as the United States
eliminates them on the field of battle. For each threat defused, another soon takes
its place; for each terrorist group disrupted, another soon arises; for each terrorist
killed, more eager recruits appear.
The 9/11 Commission warned that terrorism “will menace Americans and
American interests long after Usama Bin Ladin and his cohorts are killed or
captured.”2
The Commission was right. But U.S. policy has not heeded this
warning. Too often U.S. counterterrorism efforts have focused on a specific group
or threat, while doing too little to prevent new generations from taking up the
banner of jihad.
“ It is impossible to conclude that the enemy has
been defeated. Rather, the threat of terrorism has
metastasized.
”
7 bipartisanpolicy.org
Even as the military defeat of the Islamic State, or ISIS, appears imminent,
American policymakers must avoid the temptation of confusing the defeat of one
brutal terrorist organization with victory against terrorism. Victory against Islamist
terrorism cannot be achieved only through the military action, law enforcement, or
even targeted messaging campaigns that have been the hallmark of bipartisan
U.S. policy across three administrations now. To reduce the threat posed by
terrorism to its homeland, its citizens, its interests, and the world order it has
constructed, the United States will have to work to attenuate the conditions that
continue to attract new recruits to the terrorist cause, including the Islamist
ideology that provides jihad with its justification and objective.
Assessing the Terrorist Threat
The terrorist threat to the United States today, although diminished since 9/11,
remains grave. Though degraded, both al Qaeda and ISIS remain dangerous;
though better protected, the United States remains vulnerable.
The terrorist contingent has only grown since 9/11. The number of jihadis more
than doubled between 2010 and 2013, according to a RAND study, as terrorist
groups attract followers almost as quickly as the U.S. military can kill them.3
For
example, despite estimates that U.S. forces have killed at least 60,000 ISIS
fighters, the U.S. government believes the group has as almost as many members
now (15,000, according to the State Department) as it did in 2014 (20,000,
according to the CIA).4
Moreover, the past few years have witnessed an unprecedented increase in terror
incidents. Last year, some 25,000 people died in roughly 11,000 terrorist attacks in
104 countries.5
That is over three times as many deaths and five times as many
attacks (7,000 and 2,000, respectively) as were recorded in 2001.6
Although each
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of today’s terrorist acts might be smaller than the major attacks conducted over a
decade earlier and although many might be happening far from the American
homeland, they have nevertheless created a perception of vulnerability and fear in
Western societies.
Terrorist Groups and Their Evolution
ISIS will not cease to exist with its loss of Raqqa. Even as it loses territory in Iraq
and Syria, ISIS has already expanded into other geographic areas, including Libya,
Afghanistan, and even Southeast Asia, and founded new “branches,” including in
Nigeria. All of these could prove the seeds for new caliphates. But even without a
territory to call its own, ISIS will remain a menace.
Its unprecedented use of social media for recruitment and dissemination of
propaganda can be expected to continue. Foreign fighters who traveled from the
West to fight with the group may return to their home countries—perhaps using
civilian migration routes into Europe to disguise their true identities, as some of the
perpetrators of the 2015 Paris attacks did. For some disaffected Muslims in the
West who were not able to join it, moreover, the idea of the ISIS caliphate will
remain an inspiration.
While overshadowed by ISIS’s meteoric rise, other terrorist groups remain
dangerous and continue to seek to attack the United States. Al Qaeda’s nominal
leader, former Osama bin Laden deputy Ayman al Zawahiri, remains at large in the
Afghan-Pakistan borderlands. Hayat Tahrir al Sham, al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate,
remains a powerful force in that country’s civil war. Al Qaeda also has affiliates in
North Africa (al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) and the Indian subcontinent. The
most worrying, however, is al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), a
sophisticated adversary with a record of attempts to strike the U.S. homeland.
9 bipartisanpolicy.org
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that this constellation of groups will
continue to define the universe of terrorist organizations. Or that the same approach
pursued by ISIS in Iraq and Syria will characterize future iterations of the terrorist
threat. Ninety years ago, there was no Muslim Brotherhood; 50 years ago, there was
no Jihadi Salafism; 25 years ago no al Qaeda; and five years ago no ISIS. Five years
from now, new terrorist organizations will emerge, remnants of the earlier jihadi
organizations will linger, and the extremists will adapt.
Indeed, jihadist thinking has never been static. Groups like al Qaeda and the
Islamic State are fanatically committed to their worldview, but they have shown a
remarkable ability to adapt their tactics to the circumstances in which they find
themselves. As ISIS’s terrestrial caliphate collapses, jihadist thinking will likely
evolve in response.
ISIS imitators will likely attempt similar territory grabs in the years ahead. The
idea of the caliphate, once glimpsed, will retain its allure. Others may push for a
return to the al Qaeda methodology of focusing on terrorist attacks in the West.
Alternatively, some jihadist groups may revert to the pre-al Qaeda methodology
of targeting the “near enemy”—local regimes.
Whatever its manifestations, the next iterations of terrorism will remain a
significant threat to the United States, its interests, and its partners.
U.S. Vulnerabilities at Home and Abroad
The most direct threat to the U.S. homeland is likely to continue to come from
“enabled” attacks and terrorist exploitation of the internet. But the threat to U.S.
national interests is not limited to terrorist activity on American soil.
bipartisanpolicy.org 10
As terrorist groups lose geographic sanctuaries, they have sought to strike back by
urging potential followers to conduct attacks in the West. ISIS and AQAP have
pioneered and perfected enabled or remote-controlled attacks. In this model,
terrorist operatives use the internet to identify disaffected young people and direct
them to commit attacks in their home countries in the West, often using low-tech
tactics. These simple plots do not require advanced skills, funding, travel, or
communications. As seen in Nice, Berlin, London, and Barcelona, a truck driven by
a committed terrorist into a crowd of bystanders can kill scores of people and
instill widespread fear. Such attacks offer little to no warning, meaning that there
is almost no way for counterterrorism officials to stop them.
These attacks are enabled by terrorists’ significant presence in cyberspace,
using it for propaganda and recruiting, especially on social media. This growing
significance of the internet as a medium for radicalization as well as terrorist use
of encrypted communications to discreetly plot and orchestrate attacks are likely
to remain the most challenging fronts in the cyberwar against terrorists. Despite
jihadi threats to launch cyber attacks, their technical capabilities in this arena
appear limited.
Even if the United States could prevent all terrorist activity within its homeland,
however, it will never be safe so long as terrorism thrives in the rest of the world. “In
the post-9/11 world, threats are defined more by the fault lines within societies than
by the territorial boundaries between them,” the 9/11 Commission wrote.7
Because of
the unprecedented interconnectedness of the world in the 21st century, new threats
can emerge quickly and reach all the way across the world to menace Americans,
leading the Commission to declare, “[T]he American homeland is the planet.”8
The danger that unchecked terrorist activity can pose to the United States is most
11 bipartisanpolicy.org
glaringly underscored by the continued threat of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) falling into terrorist hands. The Islamic State, for example, has chemical
weapons in Syria and appears to have acquired radioactive materials in Iraq.9
Should they succeed in using these materials to mount a WMD attack on the
United States or Europe, the results would be devastating.
But even if the United States is not targeted directly, it still suffers from the spread
of terrorism. Transnational jihadi terrorism is inherently expansionary—if left
unchecked, it will continue to spread, eating away at the foundation of the free,
open, and lawful international system and the alliances that the United States
depends on for its prosperity and security. Terrorism’s toll on the U.S. homeland,
on the vibrant democracies of America’s European allies, on the stability of Middle
Eastern partners, and on the security of the global commons is alarming. Even
when the United States is not the target, terrorism endangers and harms the
United States and its interests.
Why is the Threat Still So Potent?
Even as the Islamic State’s caliphate collapses in Syria and Iraq, policymakers must
confront the question of why the terrorist threat remains so potent, despite 16 years
of effort by the United States and a like-minded coalition of international partners.
BPC’s review of U.S. efforts in the fight against terrorism suggests several limitations
in the way that U.S. counterterrorism policies have been formulated.
Mismatch Between Strategic Objectives and Tactics
Since 2001, leaders of the United States have promised victory: against al-Qaeda,
against ISIS, and against terrorism itself. What is more, U.S. policymakers have
realized that pursuing such a complete victory would require deploying more than
bipartisanpolicy.org 12
just military might against the terrorist threat. Thus, successive publicly articulated
U.S. strategies have developed “whole of government” approaches meant to apply
“all elements” of American power to this challenge.
Yet, the reality of the tactics that the United States has been pursuing on the
ground has been very different from what U.S. leaders have been telling the
American people. Rather than the greater struggle against a widespread,
amorphous, and ideologically motivated adversary, U.S. policymakers have
focused on the much narrower and shorter-term goal of degrading whatever
terror network or threat is most pressing at the moment.
This mismatch between the tactics the United States employs in fighting terrorism
and the bipartisan, strategic objective that has been described to the American
people creates confusion about what results to expect. The rhetoric used by
policymakers of “victory” does not square with the reality of 16 years of conflict
and a metastasizing threat. Worse, the longer U.S. policy pursues goals other than
the form of “victory” against terrorism that it has promised, the more difficult it
becomes to implement a strategy that could achieve such a victory.
Focusing on Terrorists, Not Terrorism
The United States has become exceptionally effective and ruthless in its ability to
target and eliminate terrorists. And yet, this has done little to diminish the threat or
stanch the flow of willing recruits to the jihadi cause. As then-Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld put it in a 2003 memo: “The U.S. is putting relatively little effort
into a long-range plan, but we are putting a great deal of effort into trying to stop
terrorists. The cost-benefit ratio is against us! Our cost is billions against the
terrorists’ costs of millions.” He went on to ask: “Is our current situation such that
‘the harder we work, the behinder we get?’”10
13 bipartisanpolicy.org
As long as jihad maintains its overpowering appeal, even in the face of almost
certain death, terrorist movements will persist. Defeating terrorism must entail
weakening this magnetic attraction. For all its battlefield and intelligence
successes, the United States has demonstrated little ability to degrade support
for the ideology underlying jihadist terrorism.
Misunderstanding the Enemy: Organizations vs. Movement
This tendency to tailor the U.S. counterterrorist mission and objective around the
most immediate terrorist threat was on display in President Barack Obama’s May
2010 National Security Strategy: “We are at war with a specific network, al Qaeda,
and its terrorist affiliates who support efforts to attack the United States, our
allies, and partners.”11 The singular focus on al Qaeda contributed to American
policymakers underestimating ISIS for too long. But neither al Qaeda nor ISIS, nor
any other terrorist group worldwide, is the sole manifestation of the Hydra-headed
enemy the United States seeks to defeat.
The terrorist threat confronting the United States is a broader movement. It
includes groups and individuals that are unrelated to al Qaeda or the Islamic State,
but are, like them, inspired by an extremist ideology that claims to represent one of
the world’s greatest religions. As the 9/11 Commission argued, “[T]he United
States has to help defeat an ideology, and not just a group of people.”12
Focusing on Means, Not Ends
U.S. counterterrorism policy has focused on the prevention of violence—those
thinking about, plotting, or carrying out violent attacks—without engaging the
ideological messages and narrative that justify and incite that violence.
bipartisanpolicy.org 14
U.S. attempts at counter-messaging have often focused on the group’s brutality,
depicting ISIS beheadings and crucifixions with the stated aim of sending “a
message that this is actually a squalid, worthless, dirty thing.”13 But it is not ISIS’s
means of conquest that are the source of its strength. What its supporters endorse
is the Islamic State itself, the ends its violence is meant to achieve, an end they
have come to believe justifies any means. To argue with them about the validity of
violence is to have lost the argument already.
The 9/11 Commission warned against this narrow focus: “The small percentage of
Muslims who are fully committed to Usama Bin Ladin’s version of Islam are
impervious to persuasion. It is among the large majority of Arabs and Muslims that
we must encourage reform, freedom, democracy, and opportunity.”14 Focusing on
the relatively small number of those who use violence ignores the larger context in
which violent groups operate. What U.S. policy has lacked is an understanding of
those beliefs, and the ends that terrorist groups are employing violence to achieve.
Understanding the ideology—what extremist groups want and what vision they
sell their followers—is crucial to a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy.
As long as the ends that terrorists seek are not challenged and discredited, their
appeal will continue to persuade individuals to use violence as a means of
achieving those goals.
The Gnarled Roots of Terrorism: Grievance and
Ideology
An emerging understanding of radicalization identifies its locus in the combination
of underlying conditions and ideology, acknowledging that both of these factors
play different roles, and interact with each other.
15 bipartisanpolicy.org
A Unites States Agency for International Development (USAID) study divides the
drivers of violent extremism into “push” and “pull” factors.15 While “push” factors
are sources of alienation from society and disenfranchisement, such as such as
large-scale poverty, unemployment, and government repression, “pull” factors
make terrorist groups attractive. These include the lure of financial gain, a desire
for community, a drive to feel important, the propaganda of a persuasive and
pragmatic leader, and the honor that comes with battling a foreign adversary or for
a particular ideology.
An understanding of terrorism that combines both factors recognizes the
importance of conditions that make individuals vulnerable to indoctrination by
extremist groups while also recognizing that people are shaped by more than their
circumstances. Socioeconomic conditions are not fate; individuals have a choice in
how they respond. It takes a noxious ideology that prescribes violence as the path
to a better world to turn grievances into terrorism.
A Region Aggrieved
Extremism thrives amid adverse social conditions, failures in governance, and
conflict. These are problems of which the Middle East has more than its fair share.
The region is experiencing a “youth bulge,” with 65 percent of the total population
under the age of 30 and around 30 percent of those youth unemployed.16 This
demographic fact presents a profound risk: the population most targeted by terrorist
recruiters, who need young bodies on the battlefield, is the same population failed by
Middle Eastern governments and therefore at greater risk of recruitment.
Middle Eastern countries are experiencing an acute crisis of governance. The
modern Middle Eastern state has failed to create a sense of nationhood among its
bipartisanpolicy.org 16
population. Rather than provide services to its population, Middle Eastern states
generally distribute patronage to members of the ruling family, tribe, ethnic group
or sect, while marginalizing and repressing the rest of society. The vast majority of
the people of the Middle East, 83 percent, live in countries that Freedom House
characterizes as not free.17
Conflict has also been prevalent in the Middle East’s modern history. Preceding the
upheaval of the Arab Spring and current civil war in Syria is a long history of
conflict. Arab-Israeli wars, the wave of Arab nationalism of the 50s and 60s,
experiments such as the United Arab Republic, civil wars in Lebanon, Sudan and
Yemen, the Iran-Iraq war, and two U.S.-led Gulf Wars have resulted in enormous
bloodshed and population transfers. Such violence only begets violence and
provides a breeding ground for extremism—over 90 percent of terrorist attacks
occur in nations ravaged by conflict.18
The Role of Ideology
Grievances alone, however, are not sufficient to explain terrorism. Out of the
hundreds of millions of people living in poverty, or in conflict zones, or under the
rule of repressive governments, only a small number support terrorist groups, let
alone become terrorists themselves.19 Grievances on their own are passive. They
are a result of conditions that an individual is subjected to; they do not require,
presuppose, or imply any sort of action by the individual herself. Another
ingredient, beyond onerous socioeconomic circumstances, is necessary to spur
someone to action, particularly violence.
Ideology is that ingredient. It weaponizes grievances by giving individuals an
account of what is causing their suffering, a vision of a better world, and a path
to achieving it. Yet, it remains poorly understood. “Ideology,” even in scholarly
17 bipartisanpolicy.org
studies, is most often treated as synonymous with “worldview” or “belief-system,”
a set of ideas that provide order and understanding to the world.
But ideology, in contrast to a worldview, is not about how things are, but how they
should be. It influences not navigation of the immutable features of the real world,
but action meant to change the temporary and conditional structures of society
and politics. And rather than an individual belief, ideology is a shared identity.
Nor is ideology the same as religion. Where religion is charged with the
preservation of a certain metaphysical arrangement of the world, ideology seeks
complete transformation of the man-made social and political spheres. Where
religion is focused on the sacred, ideology’s purview is purely profane, its concern
solely with this earthly world.
An ideology entails belief that one’s current circumstances are not ideal—i.e.,
grievances—and must be changed, a diagnosis of who or what is to blame for the
existence of these conditions, an alternative vision of a healed world, and the
steps that need to be taken to transform this vision into reality. Critically, the
ambition of ideology is not just to improve the individual’s lot in life; it demands the
transformation of entirety of society and politics.
When combined with grievances, ideology, therefore, presents a totalistic political
alternative to the onerous present, an alternative that demands revolutionary
transformation and replaces traditional models of social identity.
Understanding Islamist Ideology
The specific ideology tied to jihadist terrorism—Islamism—plays on Middle
Eastern and Muslim grievances to discredit current societies and states in favor of
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a transnational, revolutionary vision.
What is Islamism?
Islamism is an elusive ideology to define.20 It was born out of and as a response to
the crisis of modernity in the world of Islam. Prompted by the discovery of Western
technological, material, and military superiority, this crisis made Muslims aware of
the huge gulf that separated them from modern Europe and gave rise to the
questions “what went wrong?” and, more importantly, “how can we catch up?”
The crisis only intensified as the encounter with the West progressed from losses
to Western armies on faraway battlefields or admiration of Western intellectual
achievements to, with time, Western presence as an occupier of the very heart of
the Muslim world.
The Islamist diagnosis of this crisis is that the decline in Islam’s worldly fortunes is
directly tied to the decay of Islamic rituals, symbols and practices in the daily lives
of Muslims. Thus, the solution that Islamism champions is a simple one: a return
to an earlier period of time when the Islamic world was not in decline but in
ascendance by returning Islam to its rightful central place in the lives of Muslims.
For Islamists, Islam is incomplete without a state. The goal of all Islamist
movements is the establishment of an Islamic State, or as a leading Egyptian
Salafi described it “a state that connects heaven and earth.”
By its very nature, Islamism claims not only to be a political manifestation of Islam,
but the only possible manifestation of the religion. While Islamism exploits Islamic
symbols and concepts for legitimacy, it is distinct from Islam as it is understood and
practiced by the vast majority of Muslims worldwide. Islam is one of the world’s
great religions, worthy and deserving of respect. But Islamism rejects the diversity
of thought and practice that has developed in Islamic civilizations over the
19 bipartisanpolicy.org
centuries, and has broken from traditional Islam in matters of jurisprudence and
theology. Moreover, while traditional Sunni Islam developed a certain separation
between political and religious leaders, Islamism seeks to capture the state and
sees the state as the principal instrument for making its vision of society possible.
Indeed, Islamism requires the coercive power of the state to enact and enforce its
dictates of public morality on the entirety of society.
Islamism, Violence, and the Threat to Order
Some Islamists believe that the current crisis of Islam can still be countered
through non-violent means in Muslim societies, namely through religious
indoctrination and Islamizing society. Others view the threat level as having
reached a critical point, with violence the only possible response. In practice,
however, the distinction between violent and non-violent Islamism turns out to be
rather ambiguous, more a function of tactics and circumstance than of principle.
Much more significant than any methodological disagreements between groups is
what they share in common: a convergence of views that the world of Islam is
under siege and it is the West that stands between it and the realization of its
political ambitions.
Many of the founders of jihadi groups were originally members or passed through
the indoctrination phase of non-violent Islamist groups. According to a recent study
by The Centre on Religion and Geopolitics, for example, 51 percent of a sample of
100 jihadis had non-violent Islamist links; a quarter of those were to the Muslim
Brotherhood or affiliated organizations.21
These close ties between different types of Islamist groups, whether violent or not,
are based on their fundamental ideological alignment. No Islamist groups dispute
that the solution to the crisis of the Muslim world is a return to Islam, as they
bipartisanpolicy.org 20
understand it. No Islamist group disagrees that the West is continuously hostile to
Islam. This common narrative endorsed even by non-violent groups—of
dissatisfaction with and opposition to the current “fundamentally unjust,
oppressive and un-godly” state of the world—is a stepping stone to the
conclusion that overthrowing the current order is the only method capable of
achieving the Islamist goal.22
The conflation of religion and politics renders Islamism a totalitarian worldview
that rejects the pluralism that Islamic civilization had created throughout the
centuries. This vision includes anti-democratic, anti-pluralistic, authoritarian, and
non-compromising views, as well as a rejection of the rule of law and individual
liberty. Islamism’s belief in the need for a revolutionary transformation of the
modern political world, from an order based on individual liberty and composed
of nation states to a totalitarian and transnational autocracy, is the fundamental
challenge posed by terrorism.
Toward a Comprehensive Strategy
The United States must confront this ideology in all its forms.
The fundamental objective of U.S. policy must be the prevention of violence against
its citizens and interests. But the bipartisan approach of the three most recent
“ Focusing solely on dissuading, jailing, or killing
those planning to carry out violent terrorist acts
has done little to stop the growth and spread of
terrorism over the last decade and a half.
”
21 bipartisanpolicy.org
administrations is not sufficient to protect the United States from the
metastasizing terrorist threat.
Focusing solely on dissuading, jailing, or killing those planning to carry out violent
terrorist acts has done little to stop the growth and spread of terrorism over the
last decade and a half. So long as new generations continue being drawn to the
cause of jihad, terrorism will plague and unsettle the world.
To prevail, the United States will need a comprehensive strategy that addresses
the enemies of the United States and the ideology that encourages and sustains
them, while differentiating the response to each. Such a long-term strategy would
focus not on the adherents of Islamist ideology today—they can neither be
dissuaded by the U.S. government, nor should it be U.S. policy to target, whether
militarily or criminally, those who hold Islamist beliefs but do not act violently upon
them—but the uptake of that ideology tomorrow.
The generational struggle against Islamist terrorism will come to an end only when
the ambitions that motivate groups such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State return
to the obscurity they richly deserve. To speed that process, the United States will
have to support the conditions and values that counteract and undermine
Islamism’s appeal: governance, institutions, civil society, citizenship, pluralism,
tolerance, and a strong separation between public and private spheres.
In their Preface to the 9/11 Commission Report, Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton
urged policymakers to adopt “a balanced strategy for the long haul, to attack
terrorists and prevent their ranks from swelling while at the same time protecting
our country against future attacks.”23 Thirteen years after they wrote those words,
the terrorists’ ideas, repugnant as they are, still attract far too many young
bipartisanpolicy.org 22
Muslims to their ranks. It will not be easy, but the difficulty of discrediting Islamist
ideology must not deter us from attempting it. BPC’s next study will lay out a
strategy for doing precisely that.
23 bipartisanpolicy.org
1 Institute for Global Economics and Peace. Global Terrorism Index 2016.
2 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission
Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.
2004. 363.
3 Seth G. Jones. A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of al Qa’ida and Other Salafi Jihadists. The
RAND Corporation, 2014.
4 Jim Sciutto, Jamie Crawford and Chelsea J. Carter. “ISIS Can ‘Muster’ Between 20,000
and 31,500 Fighters, CIA Says.” CNN. September 12, 2014; Christopher Woody. “‘We’re
Being Pretty Darn Prolific’—Top US General Claims 60,000 ISIS Fighters Have Been Killed.”
Business Insider. February 15, 2017; Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent
Extremism. Country Reports on Terrorism 2016. Chapter 6. Foreign Terrorist Organizations.
Available at: https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2016/272238.htm.
5 Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism. Country Reports on Terrorism
2016. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism: Annex of
Statistical Information. Available at: https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2016/272241.htm.
6 Institute for Global Economics and Peace. Global Terrorism Index 2015.
7 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission
Report. 361.
8 Ibid., 362.
9 Ryan Browne and Barbara Starr. “First on CNN: ISIS Creating Chemical Weapons Cell in New
De Facto Capital, US Official Says.” CNN. May 17, 2017; James Phillips and Brooke Branson.
“The Growing Threat of ISIS Unleashing a Weapon of Mass Destruction.” The Daily Signal.
February 19, 2015.
10 “Rumsfeld’s War-On-Terror Memo.” USA Today. October 16, 2003.
11 The White House. National Security Strategy. May 2010. 20.
Available at: http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2010.pdf.
12 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission
Report. 376.
13 Alberto Fernandez, qtd. in Greg Miller and Scott Higham. “In A Propaganda War Against ISIS,
The U.S. Tried to Play by the Enemy’s Rules.” The Washington Post. May 8, 2015.
Endnotes
bipartisanpolicy.org 24
14 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission
Report. 375.
15 Guilain Denoeux and Lynn Carter. “Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism.” United States
Agency for International Development. February 2009.
16 Kristin Lord. “Here Come the Young.” Foreign Policy. August 12, 2016; “Youth Unemployment
on the Rise Globally, Remaining Highest in Arab States.” International Labor Organization.
August 24, 2016.
17 Freedom House. Freedom in the World 2017.
Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2017.
18 Institute for Global Economics and Peace. Global Terrorism Index 2016.
19 World Bank data showed that 10.7 percent of the world’s population lived in extreme poverty,
or on less than U.S. $1.90 a day, in 2013. (The World Bank. Poverty Overview. Available at:
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/overview. According to Freedom House, 36 percent
of the world’s population live in countries categorized as “not free.” (Freedom House. Freedom
in the World 2017.) Majorities in Muslim-majority countries in 2014 showed disapproval for
terrorist tactics, saying that suicide bombings in defense of Islam are rarely or never justified.
(“Concerns about Islamic Extremism on the Rise in Middle East.” Pew Research Center. July
1, 2014.)
20 Some of the most common definitions include: “the doctrine or movement which contends
that Islam possesses a theory of politics and the State” (Nazih Ayubi. Political Islam: Religion
and Politics in the Arab World. Routledge: London, 2006.) and “any formally or informally
organized agent acting or wishing to act on his social and/or political environment with the
purpose of bringing it into conformity with an ideal based on a particular interpretation of the
dictates of Islam.” (Stephane Lacroix. Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in
Contemporary Saudi Arabia. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 2011.)
21 Mubaraz Ahmed, Milo Comerford, and. Emman El-Badawy. “Milestones to Militancy: What the
Lives of 100 Jihadis Tell Us About a Global Movement.” Centre on Religion and Geopolitics.
April 2016. 22.
22 “Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism.” USAID. 18.
23 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission
Report. Preface, xvi.
25 bipartisanpolicy.org
Notes
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